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The Department of Defense (DoD) has started a
modernization effort to support the movement of
ammunition and general cargo for contingency
operations. This modernization effort includes the
procurement of new intermodal containers, container
handling equipment, port upgrades and agreements with
commercial industry.
In order to understand how ammunition can be
transported effectively and efficiently, the supply
chain must be examined to identify choke points,
limitations and short-falls that occur during the
ammunition movements from the depot to the "foxhole."
This thesis examines the issues affecting the
ammunition supply chain within the DoD and the Defense
Transportation System. Analysis and recommendations
are provided to improve the transportation of
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The movement of ammunition is critical in supporting
the warfighter during war. The methods and ability to
provide the right type of ammunition at the right place and
at the right time requires an enormous infrastructure. The
ammunition chain starts at the depot and ends when the user
receives the ammunition which is usually in the "foxhole".
The ammunition supply chain is only a small part of the
total distribution chain that gets supplies to the
warfighter
.
One of the new operational concepts under Joint Vision
2010 is "Focused Logistics" which relies on the armed
force's ability "to project power with the most capable
forces, at the decisive time and time." [Ref. 6:p. 44] An
effective and efficient supply chain will enable Joint
Vision 2010 to succeed. Improving the supply chain can
contribute to a smooth flow of support to joint forces
during peacetime and war. The ammunition supply chain relies
on the Nation's ability to respond with the right amount of
support at the right time.
Containerization optimizes the movement of cargo by
combining small loads into a unit inside a standardized
container. Using containers minimizes handling damage and
supports the ease of movement of the cargo. Containerization
incorporates supply, transportation, packaging, storage and
security together with visibility of containers and it's
contents into a distribution system from the source to the
user. [Ref. 19] Containerization is a major part of the
overall distribution supply chain, and ammunition is
primarily moved in containers. Though an analysis of the
ammunition supply chain, we can identify the factors that
impede the process flow of the chain and offer
recommendations for improvement.
A. DISCUSSION
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the first
major U.S. Military conflict since the commercial container
revolution. While containers were used in this effort,
their full potential was not realized, and containers played
a small part in the movement of ammunition. The Mobility
Reguirements Study (MRS) of 1992 and the subseguent MRS
Bottom-up Review Update (MRSBURU) of 1995 conducted by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff identified the benefits of
containerization to support military contingencies. [Ref.
14, 16] The reviews recommended changes that would make
ammunition distribution more efficient. There are still
facility deficiencies and imbalances within the depot-to-
theater container delivery systems, including in-transit
visibility, infrastructure, and Container Handling Equipment
(CHE)
.
DoD has started a modernization effort to support the
movement of ammunition and general cargo for contingency
operations. This modernization effort includes the
procurement of new roll-on/roll-off ships, port upgrades,
agreements with commercial industry, development of new
equipment, and modifications to existing equipment.
In order to understand how ammunition can be moved
effectively and efficiently, the supply chain must be
examined to identify choke points, limitations, and
shortfalls that occur during ammunition movements from the
depot to the user. A study of the ammunition supply chain
with an examination of ammunition exercises can determine
the capability and productivity of the chain.
B. AREA OF RESEARCH
This thesis will identify and evaluate containerized
conventional ammunition operations within the Department of
Defense (DoD) for ground and aviation forces. The objective
is to lay out the DoD ammunition supply chain and analyze
the effectiveness and efficiency of the chain. Naval
ammunition will not be addressed since resupply is primarily
conducted using organic Naval assets. In general, each
service is responsible for providing logistical support to
their own services except as provided by common or cross
level logistics. Common or cross level logistics is a
function performed by one military service such as the Army
supporting the Air Force. The Army ammunition supply chain
model is used throughout this thesis because the Army is
usually the dominant user of ammunition. The Army also has
the majority of assets (ammunition units and transportation
assets) to provide support to other services. Most services
receive ammunition from Army storage areas in a theater of
operations
.
C. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
This thesis will primarily look at the total ammunition
flow process, how containerization differs from breakbulk
operations, and how modernization efforts have affected the
flow. It will examine commercial business integration in
the ammunition supply chain, as well as the outcomes of the
TURBO Containerized Ammunition Distribution System (CADS)
exercises. The intention of this thesis is to examine the
total ammunition supply chain and provide recommendations to
improve the flow process in the future.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary question addressed by this thesis is:
• What is the current process of the ammunition supply
chain in the DoD, and how can this be improved?
The secondary questions addressed by this thesis are:
1 . What are the steps for requisitioning ammunition?
2. How is ammunition distributed from depots to the end
user?
3. What are the choke points and limiting factors in
the ammunition supply chain?
4. Can the current process be further streamlined?
5. How is commercial transportation used in the
ammunition supply chain?
6. What are the advantages and disadvantages of
including commercial transportation in the chain?
7. What is the impact of the Voluntary Intermodal
Sealift Agreement (VISA) on the ammunition supply
chain?
8. What are the different types of ammunition
containers and related equipment in the DoD
inventory?
9. What are the advantages and disadvantages to
containerization versus non-containerization?
10. How has DoD's modernization efforts impacted the
ammunition supply chain?
11. What systems are used to manage ammunition to ensure
In-transit Visibility (ITV) and Total Asset
Visibility (TAV)?
12. What are the current projects/exercises used to
evaluate the ammunition supply chain?
13. What are the lessons learned from the
CADS exercises sponsored by USTRANSCOM (United
States Transportation Command) TURBO CADS exercises,
and how can these lessons be applied to improve the
ammunition supply chain?
E . ORGANIZATION
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter
I serves as an introduction to the research issues.
Chapter II provides background information on the
ammunition supply chain. It describes how the chain flows
across the three levels of war and discusses the differences
between the wholesale and retail level of ammunition
support
.
Chapter III discusses containerized ammunition
equipment. The different types of containers and container
handling equipment is addressed, as well as the different
types of container ships and ports.
Chapter IV examines the flow process of the ammunition
supply chain. It covers management systems, flow regulation
measures, the flow process, and containerized transportation
capabilities. This chapter also identifies choke points in
the process flow, as well as the difference between wartime
and peacetime flow of ammunition. The impact of the
Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement is addressed in
relation to its impact on the supply chain.
Chapter V looks at the lessons learned from past TURBO
CADS exercises and the impact on the supply chain. This
chapter discusses how the lessons learned can be applied to
improve the ammunition supply chain.
Chapter VI will present an analysis of the ammunition
supply chain. The factors that impede the flow process such
as choke points and limitations are analyzed. Additionally,
future trends in the ammunition supply chain are discussed.
Chapter VII provides a concise overview of our
conclusions concerning the current state of containerized
ammunition, as well as our recommendations for dealing with
current and anticipated problems in the ammunition supply
chain.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE AMMUNITION SUPPLY CHAIN
A soldier can survive forever without
mail; for thirty days without food; for
three days without water; for three




Logistics is considered "the foundation of combat
power," and integrates the strategic, operational, and
tactical sustainment efforts in operations. [Ref. 5:p. 1]
The ammunition supply chain is only one facet of the overall
logistics supply chain. The ammunition chain is a
logistics pipeline that starts at the factory or depot and
ends at the foxhole or the end-user of the product. It
stretches across the three levels of war: strategic,
operational, and tactical. (See Figure 1) There are
significant operations at each level in the chain that
contribute to providing support to the warfighter in a
timely, effective, and efficient manner. [Ref. 6] This
chapter looks at the operational functions of the ammunition
supply chain that take place at each level of war.
Ammunition is defined as "ammunition of all types,
bombs, explosives, mines, fuses, detonators, pyrotechnics,
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Figure 1 Ammunition Supply Chain
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missiles, rockets, propellants, and other associated items."
[Ref. 8:p. A-6] The ammunition supply chain is designed to
provide responsive ammunition support to deployed forces
anywhere in the world. The unique characteristics of
ammunition can complicate the supply chain. Munition
characteristics include size, weight, hazardous nature,
storage and special handling requirements, accountability,
and security issues. [Ref. 8:p. A-6] The ammunition
system is divided into two distinct yet mutually supportive
parts: the wholesale ammunition distribution system and the
retail ammunition distribution system. [Ref. 7:p. 1-5]
The wholesale distribution system is associated with
the strategic level of operations located within the United
States. The system consists of resource managers located at
the Industrial Operations Command (IOC), each service,
ammunition plants, depots, and transportation control
agencies such as the U.S. Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM) . The wholesale system is the support base for
all deployed forces. Ammunition is produced based on
projected ammunition resupply demand rates as determined
during planning for operations, or the actual ammunition
forecast for the theater of operation.
The retail ammunition distribution system is associated
with the operational and tactical levels of war. This
11
system includes all supply and transportation activities
necessary to provide ammunition to each service within a
theater of operations. The IOC inventory control point
(ICP) item managers run the retail level for the Army. Each
of the other services has retail ICP item managers for
managing retail stock. Each service maintains retail stocks
for peacetime use and initial ammunition loads for wartime.
B. STRATEGIC LEVEL
The beginning of the ammunition supply chain starts at
the strategic level of war, or the wholesale level. The
strategic level covers planning and operational
requirements, the manufacturing, the storage of ammunition
in depots, and transportation inside and to locations
outside the United States.
The amount of ammunition needed to support the
requirements of the armed forces for possible contingencies
is determined by strategic planners such as unified
combatant commanders or Commanders In Chief (CINCs) , and
service component commanders. The requirements are based on
the National Security Strategy, the National Military
Strategy, the expected military missions required to achieve
strategic end states, and theater strategies and campaign
plans. Commanders consider the "availability of stocks,
12
storage locations, deployability into various theaters, and
the responsiveness of the production base to meet
shortfalls" when determining the requirements for
ammunition. [Ref. 8:p. A-l]
The Army Material Command (AMC) is responsible for
acquiring the ammunition for all the U.S. military services.
This is done by the Industrial Operations Command (IOC), a
subordinate command of AMC, located in Rock Island,
Illinois
.
The Single Manager for Convention Ammunition (SMCA)
center performs management of convention ammunition at the
strategic level. Some aviation munitions and missiles are
considered non-conventional and managed by the Aviation and
Missile Command. The SMCA center is responsible for life
cycle management of ammunition, from coordinating the
procurement of ammunition for new weapon systems to running
depots and disposal. [Ref. 13] The center receives input
from the CINCs and service component commanders to determine
the distribution and procurement of ammunition. The SMCA
center is the National Inventory Control Point (NICP) for
munitions with managers responsible for controlling several
types of munitions. Each munition is tracked, issued, and
stored by a Department of Defense Identification Code or
13
DODIC. Table 1 shows the total amount of DODICs managed as
of January 1998 by the IOC.
User Army Navy Air Force Marine
Items 3770 3544 1275
Table 1. Service Items Managed by the SMCA Center [Ref.13]
There are a number of storage facilities at the
strategic level. Ammunition is stored at several depots
throughout the United States, in limited locations overseas,
and on prepositioned ships. Since the closing of several
forward bases overseas, maritime prepositioning of
ammunition provides flexible support to forward presence
units until ammunition is shipped from the United States.
[Ref. 8] In the Continental United States (CONUS)
,
ammunition is stored in depots using a tiering concept which
is discussed below. Strategic planners use several factors
when considering the level of support required for a given
operation. Decisions of how much ammunition to procure,
store, ship, and dispose are based on current and planned
operations. Ammunition can be shipped into theaters using a
configured load concept that allows large volumes of
ammunition to move quickly from the depot or theater storage
area to the user. Most ammunition is shipped into theaters
14
in unit loads which are packaged into containers to maximize
the utilization of the container.
1. Ammunition Tiering
After the end of the Cold War, the need for large
stockpiles of conventional munitions decreased. The
Mobility Requirements Study of 1993 conducted by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff recommended a smaller, safer, and better
quality stockpile of ammunition with a reduced workforce
using fewer storage installations. [Ref. 18] Since the
majority of ammunition consumption during peacetime is for
training, a plan was developed to divide CONUS into an
eastern, central, and western region for supplying
ammunition. Except for the eastern region, each region
received one ammunition facility to reduce the cost of
transporting training ammunition during peacetime. The
eastern region received two facilities because of the larger
density of military bases located in that region in
comparison to other regions. The facilities were broken
down into different types of "Tiers" based on their
function. A Tier I facility stores the first 30 days of war
reserve ammunition and ammunition for training. The war
reserve ammunition is shipped from Tier I facilities first
during a war. Tier II facilities store war reserve
ammunition to be used after the first 30 days, and Tier III
15
facilities store excess ammunition. Two of the Tier III
facilities, Seneca and Savanna, are scheduled for closure
under the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions of
1995. Table 2 lists the name and location of each depot by
Tier.
TIER I LOCATION
Eastern Blue Grass Army Depot, Kentucky
Crane Army Ammunition Activity, Indiana
Central McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma
Western Tooele Army Depot, Utah
TIER II LOCATION
Eastern Anniston Army Depot, Alabama
Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania
Central Red River Army Depot, Texas
Western Hawthorne Army Depot, Nevada
TIER III LOCATION
Eastern Seneca Army Depot, New York
Central Savanna Army Depot, Illinois
Western Sierra Army Depot, California
Table 2. Ammunition Depot Tiers [Ref. 11]
2 . Strategic Considerations
The ammunition supply chain must be capable of
supporting each service, joint forces, and a variety of
multinational forces. During the planning of operations and
16
determination of requirements, several factors are used to
determine the overall ammunition support strategy. The
development of new technologies such as laser guided bombs,
artillery projectiles, and the future development of high-
lethality technologies will reduce the volume of ammunition
needed for future conflicts. "It is unlikely that future
conflicts will require the massive volumes of stocks needed
to support the European AirLand force of the 1980' s." [Ref.
8:p. A-2] Although smaller amounts of ammunition may be
needed in the future, strategic planners must also consider
the operational and tactical level factors in their plans to
ensure all contingencies in the supply chain are covered.
The following are some factors considered by strategic
planners :
• Total requirements
• Stockpile management including acquisition, long term





• Disposal of ammunition stocks [Ref. 7:p. 2-2]
Some considerations at the operational and tactical
level are capabilities of the transportation system,
understanding the CINC's requirements and priorities, and
17
the needs of joint and multinational forces. Prior
planning for operations will determine what kind of support
is needed to move ammunition to the user.
3. Configured Loads
Configured loads were designed during the cold war to
provide high usage ammunition quickly within a theater of
operations. Configured loads were originally designed for
artillery units who are traditionally the largest volume
users' of ammunition. Configured Loads are pre-planned
packages of ammunition designed to fit on a semi-trailer or
a Palletized Load System (PLS) flatrack. The packaged
ammunition is transported as a single unit and supports a
particular type of combat unit or weapon system. Planning
for configured loads happens in peacetime to enhance wartime
resupply coordination to the tactical level. [Ref. 7:p. 2-8]
An example of a configured load would be artillery rounds
that are grouped together with the primer and gunpowder to
form a single shipment load to an artillery unit.
When the configured load is packaged at depots in the
United States, it is considered strategic or a Strategic
Configured Load (SCL) . An SCL is designed to fit inside a
container, but it can also be moved in breakbulk form.
Containerization keeps an SCL together as a single unit,
which makes it more efficient to transport.
18
When a configured load is packaged at the operational
or tactical level, it's considered a Mission Configured Load
(MCL) . [Ref . 35] The Cold War term for MCL is a Combat
Configured Load (CCL) a term still used in older
publications. For both types of loads, the ammunition end
user is at the operational and tactical level.
There are currently forty-nine designated configured
loads to support units that may deploy to a theater of
operations. [Ref. 3] New equipment is being developed to
enhance the supply chain using SCL and MCL concepts. The
new equipment, the types of equipment, and containers used
to transport and handle ammunition will be discussed in
detail in Chapter III.
C. OPERATIONAL LEVEL
The operational level starts when ammunition leaves the
United States and enters the theater of operations at ports
and airfields, and ends at the tactical area. (Figure 1)
The operational level is the link between the strategic and
tactical level of war and is sometimes referred to as the
Communications Zone. The operational level is responsible
for establishing the theater level reception, management,
and distribution of ammunition. Most ammunition arrives in
the theater of operations in containers.
19
In the past, the maritime transportation industry
primarily utilized breakbulk cargo ships for transporting
dry goods, and DoD relied on commercial breakbulk ships for
military shipments, including ammunition. In the past
twenty-five years, however, there has been a revolution in
the transportation industry, leaving behind the traditional
breakbulk methods and shifting to intermodal container
transportation. The commercial maritime industry has
developed internationally recognized standard equipment that
can operate intermodally using ships, railroad, and trucks
to efficiently transport container around the world.
Containerization is an effective part of the intermodal
system at the strategic and operational levels, but requires
a large amount of container handling equipment to unload the
containers from ships or barges. The other way to move
ammunition is by the breakbulk method. Moving ammunition by
breakbulk is an inefficient way to move large volumes of
ammunition when compared to containerization. Breakbulk
involves moving individual pallets of munitions and is
therefore quite labor intensive. On the other hand, the
equipment required to move and store many pallets at one
time, as a single unit through containerization, is quite
capital intensive.
20
Moving ammunition in breakbulk is "primarily used at
ports which, either because of low cargo volume or local
economic factors, lack the modern facilities" to off-load
container. [Ref. 18:p. IV- 1] Self-sustaining container
ships and Logistics Over The Shore (LOTS) operations reduce
the required to utilize breakbulk method because of a lack
of modern port facilities. The Defense Transportation
System (DTS) relies on commercial industry and technology
for new methods of shipping cargo. Breakbulk shipping
operations is no longer economically viable in commercial
shipping operations since the development and wide spread
use of the containers and container ships. [Ref. 18:p. IV-2]
Moving ammunition in containers is the preferred method
because of the efficiencies in handling and storage that
containers provide. Containerizing improves the delivery
times of resupply by reducing handling, ship loading, and
discharge time. [Ref. 10:p. 3-3]
Normally, each service is responsible for support of
its own forces except when that support is provided for by
agreements with other services. When deployed for major
operations, all the services become interdependent, and the
CINC may designate a particular service, usually the
dominant user, to provide ammunition support for the entire
theater. [Ref. 8] The Army ammunition supply chain model
21
at the operational and tactical level is used in this thesis
because the Army is usually the dominant user of ammunition.
The Army also has the majority of assets (ammunition units
and transportation assets) to provide any needed support to
other services.
Ammunition is received at ports and airfields, and then
moved to storage areas. The storage areas are Theater
Storage Areas (TSAs) and/or Corps Storage Areas (CSAs)
.
General support (GS) ammunition companies from the Army
provide conventional ammunition support to the theater by
establishing and running TSAs and CSAs. Once ammunition is
transported to an individual service, they are responsible
for storage.
Management of ammunition at the operational level is
conducted by Material Management Centers (MMCs) located at
the theater and corps level. The Theater Army Material
Management Center (TAMMC) "serves as the primary interface
between the theater and the sustaining base.'' [Ref. 10:p. 2-
15] Ammunition received from the strategic level is
distributed to TSAs and CSAs by the TAMMC. The Corps
Material Management Center (CMMC) coordinates with the TAMMC
and provides the management link between the tactical and
operational level. [Ref. 8] (See Figure 2)
22
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Figure 2. Ammunition Management
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D. TACTICAL LEVEL
The tactical level is where the ammunition supply chain
ends. Ammunition planning is conducted at this level to
ensure ammunition is available to the maneuver commander who
is usually in charge of the combat forces. Storage areas in
the tactical level are called ammunition supply points
(ASPs) and ammunition transfer points (ATPs) . (See Figures 1
and 2) Tactical storage areas are used for temporary
storage before moving ammunition forward on the battlefield.
Direct support (DS) ammunition companies of the Army provide
the support to establish and run ASPs and ATPs. [Ref. 7: p.
1-5] Each DS ammunition company has the capability to
establish and operate three ASPs and one ATP.
The ASP provides ammunition to ATPs, and provides area
support to non-divisional units in a Division area of
operations. ATPs are established and operated by forward
support units of each Division. ATPs provide ammunition to
combat units. Ammunition in an ATP is stored on PLS
flatracks or semi-trailers.
Providing the required quantity and type of ammunition
to the combat user at the right time and place requires a
responsive and flexible supply chain. The Maneuver Oriented
Ammunition Delivery System (MOADS) uses Mission Configured
Loads (MCL) to deliver ammunition to most combat units.
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MOADS delivers ammunition to high volume users such as field
artillery, armor, infantry, aviation, combat engineers, and
air defense units. [Ref. 8] The Palletized Loading System
(PLS) is primarily used to provide ammunition to units using
the MOADS concept, and its versatility in the ammunition
supply is important. [Ref. 12] The ammunition supply chain
ends at the ATP or when a unit receives the ammunition.
Management of ammunition at the tactical level is done
by a Division Ammunition Officer (DAO) who is responsible
for coordinating ammunition efforts in the tactical level or
combat zone with the ASP, ATP, and units. The DAO
interfaces with the CMMC and TAMMC on ammunition issues, and
is located in the Division Material Management Center
(DMMC) . [Ref. 7:p. 2-12] (See Figure 2)
E. AMMUNITION FOR OTHER SERVICES
When ammunition enters a theater of operations, it is
designated for different services by the DoD Identification
Code (DODIC) for each type of ammunition. Most ammunition
designated for services other than the Army is shipped to
that service directly when it arrives in the theater, or it
is stored at the TSA. This is dependent on the other
service's organic storage capabilities and support
25
agreements. Theater transportation assets are used to
deliver ammunition to Air Force and Marine Corps units.
The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) maintains an initial 30-
day supply of ammunition with the Marine Expeditionary Unit
(MEU) . This ammunition is used until the supply chain is
established from CONUS . USMC doctrine emphasizes the use of
organic transportation assets to move ammunition, and places
less emphasis on a structured distribution system. If
ammunition designated for the USMC arrives in theater, it
will most likely be delivered to the Forward Service Support
Group (FSSG) who then handles distribution for the Marine
Corps. [Ref. 9]
Similarly, Air Force units will receive ammunition from
the ports, airfields, or the TSA. Initial ammunition
arrives via preposition ships until the supply chain is
established. The Air Force uses organic assets to move
ammunition once it is delivered to an air base.
The IOC stores Naval munitions at the wholesale level
and transports it to Naval magazines for retail use. The
Navy resupplies ammunition to its ship at sea using
specialized replenishment ships. Naval ammunition is not
discussed in the remainder of this thesis because it does
not utilize or rely on the Outside Continental United States
26
(OCONUS) portion of the supply chain as much as the other
services. Also, naval ammunition operations, as presently
configured, are not easily adaptable to standard intermodal
containerizat ion for the complete movement from depot to
supply ship, much less to the warship (combatant ship)
.
F. CONCLUSION
The ammunition supply chain involves many parts that
can extend for thousands of miles across the three levels of
war. The characteristics of munitions require a large
infrastructure to transport it from the wholesale level to
the retail level. Controlling and managing ammunition
requires extensive coordination, planning and communication.
The strategic or wholesale level produces, stores and issues
ammunition to the retail level. The retail level is
associated with the operational or tactical level of war.
Once ammunition is received in the theater of operations, it
is distributed to storage areas or to the user. Sometimes
ammunition is received in strategic configured loads or
reconfigured into mission loads to improve the flow process
to the using unit or storage area.
The next chapter discusses containerized ammunition
equipment. It examines the specific types of equipment,
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III. CONTAINERIZED AMMUNITION EQUIPMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
Specialized equipment is a prerequisite for the
effective use of intermodal transportation. The decision to
transport ammunition intermodal ly is based on a number of
factors. DoD Directive 4500.37, Management of the DoD
Intermodal Container System, states that containerization is
the preferred method of ammunition shipment primarily based
on efficiency. However, a number of obstacles prevent the
complete shift to intermodal ammunition transportation.
These obstacles lie in the unique elements required to
utilize intermodal transition.
This chapter presents the different container types and
container handlinq equipment (CHE) used in transportation of
munitions intermodally . Intermodal vessels used in
ammunition transportation are also discussed.
B. AMMUNITION CONTAINERS AND CONTAINER HANDLING EQUIPMENT
The Department of Defense (DoD) uses several types of
containers and handlinq equipment to support the deployment
and sustainment of the armed forces. The followinq are used
specifically in the transportation of ammunition.
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1. MILVAN - Ammunition Restraint
The MILVAN is a specially designed, end-opening
container developed to carry between 31,560 lbs. and 39,800
lbs. of ammunition. The MILVAN has an internal restraint
system that is made up of rails permanently installed along
the sides of the container and 25 adjustable crossbars
designed to keep the ammunition from moving inside the
container. Fork lift pockets are placed along the bottom
sides for easy CHE access. Most MILVANs are 8 feet wide, 8
feet high and 10 or 20 feet long; however, some have been
procured that are 8.5 feet high. Both of these MILVAN sizes
also meet International Standards Organization (ISO)
requirements. [Ref. 34:p. 3]
2. 20 Foot ISO End-Opening Container
These containers are the standard 8 feet wide, 8 feet
high, 20 feet long containers used in the commercial
industry with one modification. The door-end cornerposts
have been modified with an angle iron to allow wooden
dunnage to be used without disturbing the force to the door.
There is no permanent restraint system. These containers
also have standard handling fittings on the top of the
container as well as forklift pockets along the bottom.
The end-opening container will probably be the
cornerstone of the DoD' s general container system. It is
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currently the standard throughout the commercial industry
and is familiar to those who work with handling and
stuf f ing/unstuf f ing containers. [Ref. 34 :p. 7] (See Figure
3)
3. 20 Foot ISO Side-Opening Container
These containers are similar to the 20 foot ISO end-
opening container with one difference: they have two double
doors located on the side of the container instead of a door
at one end. These containers provide easy access to their
contents by forklift, and they also are fitted with internal
tie down points for securing ammunition.
Side-opening containers provide a unique way to unstuff
the container. It is easy for almost any forklift to reach
the cargo inside, and consequently, this container type is
used very successfully with many different sizes and types
of ammunition. [Ref. 34:p. 13] (See Figure 4)
4 . 20 Foot Half-Height Container
These containers are 8 feet wide and 20 feet long, but
they are only 4 feet 3 inches in height. They have fixed
sides and one end drops down to allow easy access by a
forklift. Although there is no top on this container, bows
and tarpaulins are provided to cover the contents. These
containers are extremely useful for transporting very
31
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Figure 4. Side-Opening Container [Ref. 19:p. 11-12]
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dense ammunition that does not require much space. [Ref.
34:p. 17] (See Figure 5)
5. 20 Foot Flatrack
A flatrack is a shipping platform with no top or sides,
and may or may not have end-walls. Flatracks used for
ammunition shipments are 8 feet wide and 20 feet long with
end-walls, container handling fittings and forklift pockets.
Flatracks are used to transport high cube munitions that are
slightly larger than the door dimensions of a standard ISO
container. The flatrack is the least desirable type of
container to use with ammunition transportation because it
does not provide much security for the ammunition; however,
it may be used when quick jettison of the ammunition is
required in the event of an emergency situation. [Ref. 34 :p.
35] (See Figure 6)
6. Load and Roll Pallet (LRP)
The LRP is a steel frame platform designed to fit
inside a standard 20 foot ISO container. One end of the
platform is fitted with rollers. To move the platform, the
end without the roller is lifted by a forklift or a truck
with a winch, and the load can be rolled into or out of a
container. This system is exclusively used for the
transportation of missiles such as a complete load of four




Figure 5. Half-Height Container [Ref. 2:p. 11-15]
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ftCONTAINERTYPE NATIONAL STOCK NUM BER |
Navy 8145-01-290-7335
Army Not Assigned
40' Heavy Duty 0910-LP-248-8600
Dime nsions Military Military Commercial Commercial
(inches) 20- toot 40-foot 20-foot 40-foot
Internal Length 234 456 217-233 460-464
Width 94 96 80-92 88-96
Height 88 1 102-162 82-92 76-86
External Length 240 480 239-240 480
Width 96 96 96 96
Height 96 132-186 102 102-108
Deck Height 7.9 30 10-20 24-26
Weight Tare 6.500 22,000 4,900-6,516 10,042-11,903
(lbs) Payload 38,300 ',44,000 38,540-59,990 55,840-89,170
Gross 44,800 166,000 44.800-66,140 67.200- 99,200
Figure 6. Flatracks [Ref. 19:p. 11-20]
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Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) pods. There are
approximately 500 LRP units controlled by MTMC in the DoD
inventory. [Ref. 34:p. 39] (See Figure 7)
7. Container Roll-On/Off Platform (CROP)
The CROP is a piece of handling equipment that is
currently in the design and proving phase of development and
is not yet in operational use. The CROP will handle general
cargo as well as ammunition and is designed to fit inside a
20 foot ISO front opening container; it has front and rear
locks that allow it to self-lock inside the container. The
CROP will weigh about 3,300 to 3,700 lbs. Once installed,
the CROP will allow easy access to the container contents
via the rolling mechanism in its base. This will decrease
stuffing and unstuffing times dramatically once implemented.
The CROP is conceptually similar to the just described LRP,
except that LRP is specialized for missiles while CROP is
designed to accommodate a variety of commodities including
most types of ammunition. [Ref. 19:p. III-3] (See Figure 8)
8. 50,000 Pound Rough Terrain Container Handler and
Top Handler (RTCH & TH)
This equipment, with the top handler, can handle 20,
35, and 40 foot ISO containers with gross weights up to
50,000 lbs. over improved or unimproved terrain such as soft
soil and beaches. A special fork kit is also available to
lift 20 foot half-height containers, flatracks, loaded and
37
Figure 7. Load and Roll Pallet Assembly
[Ref. 19:p. 11-21]
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Figure 8. CROP with Palletized Loading System [Ref. 3]
empty CROPs, and containers with fork pockets as the only
available lift fixture. The RTCH is a four wheel drive
vehicle capable of driving through up to five feet of water.
The RTCH provides extensive flexibility for container
handling in the field. [Ref. 19:p. 11-22] (See Figure 9)
9. Rough Terrain Container Crane (RTCC)
The RTCC is a wheel mounted crane capable of lifting a
fully loaded ISO 20 foot or 40 foot container. This
equipment can augment the use of a 50,000 Pound RTCH in the
transfer of containers and other cargo between
transportation modes and in storage areas. The RTCC can be
operated on hard surfaces or on soft surfaces with wooden
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platform sections to support the weight. [Ref. 19:p. 11-22]
(See Figure 10)
Figure 9. Rough Terrain Container Handler and Top Handler
[Ref. 19:p. 11-25]
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Figure 10. Rough Terrain Container Crane [Ref. 2:p. 11-23]
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10. Palletized Load System (PLS)
The PLS is a tactical wheeled truck and trailer system
with self load and unload capability utilizing removable
flatracks. This vehicle is designed for field use and
supports the Army' s ammunition distribution system concept
known as Maneuver Oriented Ammunition Delivery System
(MOADS) . This vehicle provides for the relocation of
ammunition stocks to various ammunition supply points. [Ref.
19:p. III-2] (See Figure 11)
C. CONTAINER SHIPS
The transport of intermodal containers has led to the
development of dedicated and combination (break-bulk and
containers) container ship designs. There are four primary
types of ships used in the intermodal transportation of
ammunition:
• Non-Self -Sustaining Containership
• Self -Sustaining Containership
• Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH) vessels
• Barge Ships
Containerships, self-sustaining and non-self-
sustaining, are specifically designed to carry all of their
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Figure 11. Basic Palletized Load System Truck/Trailer
[Ref. 19:p. III-4]
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cargo in ISO containers in cells below deck and stacked
above deck. These ships can usually carry a mix of 20 and
40 foot containers. Containerships vary considerably in
size from a capacity of 400 or less Twenty-Foot Equivalent
Units (TEUs) , to more than 6000 TEUs in the new super
container ships. (See Figures 12 & 13)
LASH vessels are designed with holds and decks similar
to containerships and have clear access to the stern for
loading and unloading of individual barges. The LASH has a
gantry crane that conveys the barges or lighterage between
the vessel and the water. Containers and/or breakbulk cargo
is stored on the individual barges then secured on the LASH
for transit . This type of vessel has proven successful in
TURBO CADS exercises and provides excellent flexibility with
regards to port depths. The LASH's ability to debark the
barges outside the port allow access to shallower areas.
(See Figure 14)
Barge ships also provide flexibility for ocean transit
of containers or breakbulk but are limited to the number of
containers carried and are generally slower than the other
vessels discussed here.
All but the Self -Sustaining Containership require crane
services to load and unload containers from the ships or
barges. Supplemental CHE is required if a port has minimal
or no intermodal capabilities, such as cranes and forklifts.
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Figure 12. Non-Self-Sustaining Containership [Ref . 19 :p. III-6]
Figure 13. Self-Sustaining Containership [Ref.l9:p. III-7]
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Figure 14. LASH Ship [Ref. 18 :p. IV-4]
The DoD owns ten auxiliary crane ships (T-ACSs) which can be
used to solely provide or augment the intermodal crane
capability of a seaport of embarkation (SPOE) and/or seaport
of debarkation (SPOD) . The use of crane ships requires
significant advance notice and planning to ensure the assets
are available and in place. (See Figure 15)
The use of Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) vessels for the
shipment of ammunition is limited. These vessels are
specifically designed to carry wheeled and tracked vehicles
as all or most of its cargo. Initial ammunition load-outs
in tanks and trucks for artillery units are carried aboard
in their respective vehicles but containerized ammunition
for sustainment is not normally moved on RO/ROs.
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Figure 15. Auxiliary Crane Ship (T-ACS) [Ref. 18 :p. IV-8]
D. CONCLUSION
Intermodal transportation requires unique and special
equipment. Transportation of ammunition intermodally
requires even further specialization. The capital
investments needed to put a system in place to fully
transport ammunition intermodally is considerable; however,
the efficiencies gained are greater. Labor, handling and
storage costs are reduced while throughput is increased
exponentially. With the commercial industry shifting to
intermodalism, the infrastructure to support ammunition
transfer is available and DoD directives are shifting the
Defense Transportation System to an intermodal network. The
future should allow for almost all ammunition to be
transported intermodally from the depot to the foxhole.
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In the next chapter, management systems, flow
regulation measures, the flow process, and containerized
transportation capabilities is discussed. The choke points
and limitations in the supply chain are detailed, as well as
the difference between wartime and peacetime flow.
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IV. FLOW PROCESS OF THE AMMUNITION SUPPLY CHAIN
The ammunition supply chain is a flow process, which
may be described in terms of the subject of the flow, the
resources that enable the flow, and the communication that
coordinates the flow. The subject of the flow is ammunition,
which is stored at depots and can be transported either in
containers or by breakbulk methods.
Where the previous chapter discussed the equipment that
enables the flow, this chapter examines management systems
at the wholesale and retail levels, and the regulation
measures including communication systems, which coordinate
the flow of ammunition. The capabilities and limits of the
Defense Transportation System (DTS) are also addressed,
including the implications of the Volunteer Intermodal
Sealift Agreement (VISA) in the context of port capability.
A. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
The objective of an automated information system is to
provide asset visibility including timely and accurate
information on the location, movement, status, identity, and
requisitions of ammunition. Having asset visibility will
allow for greater military readiness. [Ref. 21, 24] This
readiness will be attained by allowing the supply chain to
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be responsive in identifying and moving priority munitions,
the elimination of duplicate orders (a consequence of
requisition visibility) , and tracking the flow of munitions
to identify possible choke points. Each service determines
their own requirements for ammunition based on future year
budgets, war plans, and distribution plans. [Ref. 31]
Requirements for ammunition are sent to the Single Manager
for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) center who then
determines how best to produce and where to store the
ammunition at the wholesale level.
The center manages wholesale ammunition, coordinates
the production base, and oversees the operations at five
arsenals, ten depots, and twenty-two ammunition plants.
[Ref. 13] The center consolidates requisitions from each
service to gain efficiencies and economies of scale in the
production of ammunition. The SMCA center performs the
wholesale level management for each service and the retail
management for the Army. The other services provide retail
management through the use of Inventory Control Point (ICP)
managers. Although the SMCA center performs wholesale
management, each service operates wholesale information




At the wholesale level, the SMCA center maintains
control through the use of several information systems, such
as the Commodity Command Standard System (CCSS) , the
Standard Depot System (SDS) and Distribution Standard System
(DSS) , and the Worldwide Ammunition Reporting System (WARS)
for the Army. The CCSS and other service's munition
information systems interface through the Defense Automated
Addressing System (DAAS) which acts as a information
depository. [Ref. 20] The CCSS is a business system, which
provides financial data and asset visibility of ammunition
stored at Depots. The SDS is a legacy system and is
currently being replaced by the Distribution Standard System
(DSS)
.
The DSS will provide Automated Information System
(AIS) support for basic depot process operations such as
receiving, storage, shipping, stock selection, packing, and
transportation. [Ref. 20] WARS provides ammunition
requirements and asset visibility for the Army and serves a
link between the wholesale and retail level. [Ref. 26]
The Air Force maintains visibility and inventory data
on wholesale assets through the Combat Ammunition System for
Allocation (CAS-A)
, and the Marines use the Marine Automated
Ammunition Report System II (MAARS-II). [Ref. 28,29]
Besides interfacing with the SMCA center for visibility and
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inventory data, these systems can pass requisition data to
the SMCA, but not between the services. During wartime in a
theater of operations, the Army is responsible for
requisitioning all ground based ammunition for the Army and
Marine Corps. [Ref. 31] It's not important to know how the
systems of each service works, but what those systems
provide to the managers. Unlike general supply information
systems, which handle many commodities, ammunition is
considered a specialized commodity and therefore has its own
management system. Table 3 lists which ammunition
information systems are associated with each service at the
wholesale and retail level.
Level SMCA Air Force Army Marines
Wholesale cess CAS -A cess MAARS-II
Retail WARS/SAAS CAS-B/D WARS/SAAS ROLMS
Table 3. Ammunition Information Systems [Ref. 20]
2. Retail Systems
At the retail level, each service operates an
information reporting system. Retail ICP managers mainly
control ammunition that's used for training operations and
the basic unit load of ammunition that an unit would deploy
with during a contingency operation or actual deployment.
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The Army uses the Standard Army Ammunition System (SAAS) .
The Air Force uses the Combat Ammunition System for Retail
(CAS-B)
,
and the Marine Corps uses the Retail Ordnance
Logistics Management System (ROLMS) . [Ref. 20] Each system
is a management information system that integrates
ammunition management and reporting functions from
individual service retail sites to the theater storage sites
and users in a combat zone. [Ref. 7, 31] The SAAS and CAS
systems have sub-systems that are tailored to the
requirements of the organizational level where they are
located. For example, the Air Force uses the CAS-B in CONUS
and, in a theater of operations, they use the CAS-D
(Deployed) . [Ref. 28] The Army uses SAAS-1/3 in CONUS and
in the theater of operations. Each system provides similar
data, but in different ways that are unique to each service.
For an feel of what each service system accomplishes, the
following is a list of functions that the SAAS system
provides
:
• Stock status summaries by location.
• Requirement computations and status of allocations.
• Visibility of stocks in-transit and transportation
assets
.
• Requisitioning data and maintenance information.
• Complete round status and information for higher
level reports. [Ref. 7]
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3. Future System
DoD is in the process of developing a new AIS called
the Joint Ammunition Management System (JAMSS) . The JAMSS
will become the single Joint wholesale ICP and command level
management system used by each service. It is scheduled for
initial testing with the Marines in January 1999. [Ref. 32]
The JAMSS will provide ammunition visibility and logistics
functions throughout the wholesale and retail level. It will
not replace each service's system, but serve as a bridge to
link information for higher level management with
connectivity through the Global Transportation Network.
[Ref. 28,29,30,31,32] One of the major problems in Desert
Shield/Desert Storm (DS/DS) was the lack of interface, data
standardization, common machine language software, and
hardware connectivity. [Ref. 22 :p. 27] A goal of JAMSS is
to provide total ammunition asset visibility, and a seamless
flow of information to CINCs and service component
commanders. The JAMSS will, in effect, standardize the
management of ammunition in DoD through a common system and
correct problems encountered during DS/DS.
The JAMSS is part of the Defense Total Asset Visibility
Plan. [Ref. 20] One part of the JAMSS is the Munitions
Transportation Management System (MTMS) . The MTMS is a
stand alone system operated by the Joint Movement
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Transportation Coordinating Activity (JTMCA) . The JTMCA is
the:
Focal point for export munitions ship planning,
coordinating, and execution actions for those
munitions moving aboard common user sealif t... [ It ]
consolidates all services munition requirements...
into effective and efficient movement plans
designed to provide... advance shipment planning
visibility. [Ref. 17]
The SMCA center coordinates with the JMTCA who then
provides transportation data to the depots and United States
Transportation Command. The ability to provide usable
information and visibility is the key to JAMSS. Visibility
will give CINCs the capability to influence the ammunition
flow depending on the fluidity of the situation.
B. FLOW REGULATION MEASURES
The flow of ammunition is constrained by the
availability of the supply chain to transport and distribute
the required ammunition to the right place at the right
time. To govern the consumption of ammunition in a theater
of operations, CINCs establish control measures to minimize
the impact of ammunition in short supply or critical to
mission success. The flow measures are known as the
Required Supply Rate (RSR) or availability rate and the
Controlled Supply Rate (CSR)
.
The RSR is the estimated amount of ammunition a combat
commander will need to sustain operations without any
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restrictions over a specified period of time. The estimate
starts at the combat level and is expressed in rounds per
weapon per day or as bulk allotment per day or per mission.
As the threat of mission changes, so does the RSR. RSRs are
consolidated at the theater level and compared against the
total ammunition assets expected for the operation to create
a CSR.
The CSR is the amount of ammunition that can be
allocated based on the availability of ammunition assets,
storage facilities, and transportation assets. The CSR is
expressed in the same terms as the RSR. Combat commanders
use the CSR to regulate the flow of ammunition to units
engaged in operations. Depending on the level of intensity a
unit may experience, the RSR may be higher for one location
versus another. This is where the flexibility of the supply
chain becomes a factor in supporting the warfighter.
Flexibility includes the ability of transportation assets to
move ammunition quickly, the ability to maintain visibility,
and the ability to communicate with all units. Ammunition
stockage levels are based on the projected supply rates and
normally converted to short-tons to determine total daily
tonnage lift requirements. [Ref. 7:p. 2-1-6]
These rates can be established during contingency
planning based on factors, such as the expected type of
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units supported, the amount of ammunition on-hand, expected
time until resupply, and the level of anticipated
operational intensity. The control rates direct the flow of
ammunition into a theater and can be used to estimate how
much ammunition should be shipped from CONUS . During Desert
Storm/Desert Shield (DS/DS), ammunition requirements
increased by 1500 percent as the mission changed from
defensive to offensive, and General Schwarzkopf ordered a 60
day supply buildup in theater. [Ref. 22: p.l38;23: p. 161]
This was based on expected combat operations, the enemy's
potential to hamper sea transportation, and concerns with
the transportation system. The assumption was that the extra
supply would fix any potential resupply problems, but only
instead caused choke points. [Ref. 23: p. 161] If the enemy
would have interfered with the flow of ammunition during
DS/DS, combat units could have been limited to how much
ammunition they could expend each day.
C. AMMUNITION FLOW PROCESS
For each service the handling and transportation of
ammunition is almost the same until it reaches a theater of
operations. Service ICP managers at the retail level receive
requisitions from their units for ammunition. If service
ICPs fill the requisition, then a source would be identified
from retail or wholesale stocks. Each service would issue
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from their retail stocks before requesting ammunition from
the wholesale level. For ammunition controlled at the
wholesale level, each service would send their requirements
to the SMCA center. The SMCA processes the requisition and
releases the ammunition for issue from a desiqnated depot.
The requisition is used by MTMS to derive transportation
requirements for all ammunition that is exported. [Ref. 30]
Using MTMS, JMTCA works with Military Traffic management
Command (MTMC) , Military Sealift Command (MSC) , each
service, and the depots to provide the most efficient way to
transport munitions to the theater of operations.
During peacetime operations, the object is to minimize
costs while meeting the Required Delivery Date (RDD) for
each service or to support operations. Only two ships sail
with ammunition to locations overseas each year, either to
Europe or to the Pacific. In recent years, USTRANSCOM has
used these ammunition shipments to evaluate the
Containerized Ammunition Delivery System (CADS) in exercises
called TURBO CADS. TURBO CADS addresses and studies the
operation of transporting ammunition intermodally . During
peacetime, ammunition is shipped through three military
ammunition ports: Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point
(MOTSU) , North' Carolina; Concord Naval Weapons Station
(NWS), California; and Port Hadlock, Washington. Military
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Sealift Command (MSC) uses chartered ships, Ready Reserve
Force (RRF) ships, and commercial ships to move ammunition
from military ammunition ports.
During wartime, ammunition can move through commercial
ports to the theater of operations. The majority of
ammunition will be transported using sealift assets because
of its characteristics. Only high priority, mission
essential ammunition would be transported by air. During
wartime, there are no limitations, such as minimizing cost,
other than meeting the Required Delivery Date (RDD) set by
the CINC. It is critical to have the right ammunition at the
right place and time to support the warfighter during
wartime
.
When ammunition is received in a theater of operations,
it is transported through designated locations such as ports
(water and air) , or by Logistics Over The Shore (LOTS)
operations. LOTS involves the discharge of cargo from a
anchored ship onto lighterage. It is then transported to a
discharge site on shore. LOTS is used when developed ports
are not available or to supplement the throughput capability
of developed ports.
Ammunition is transported to storage areas such as the
TSAs, CSAs, or ASPs for distribution to the user.
Initially, ammunition is automatically pushed forward from
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the TSA and CSA to units in the combat zone. This is
referred to as a push system of resupply versus the pull
system. A pull system ships ammunition after a requirement
is generated, that is, in response to a user request or
requisition. A push system moves ammunition based on
planning factors. [Ref. 7]
D. TRANSPORTATION CAPABILITIES
Moving ammunition in containers involves an enormous
infrastructure, which is provided by commercial and military
resources. The infrastructure is part of the Defense
Transportation System (DTS). The DTS incorporates sealift,
airlift, surface transportation, and prepositioned
equipment to transport ammunition, supplies, equipment, and
personnel to the war fighter. The DTS supports the Joint
Vision 2010 concept of focused logistics in "fusing
information, transportation, and other technologies to allow
precise delivery." [Ref. 11] Some key attributes of the
ammunition supply chain are depot outload capabilities, port
throughput, in-transit visibility, in-theater port and
transportation capabilities. There are choke points, such as
the lack of infrastructure or Container Handling Equipment
(CHE), within each of these key attributes.
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Intermodalism plays an integral part in the flow of
ammunition by providing a fast, efficient, flexible, and
high volume lift capability.
Intermodalism is the concept of transporting...
freight in such a way that all the parts of the
transportation process, including information
exchange, are efficiently connected and
coordinated, offering flexibility. [It] is the
seamless and continuous...transportation... on two or
more transportation modes. [Ref. 25:p. 1]
For example, an ammunition container can be transferred from
a railroad car directly to a ship. Using containers and
intermodalism increases the utilization of the ammunition
supply chain. Since containerization is the preferred
method to ship munitions and only small percentages of
munitions are airlifted, containerization and surface
transportation will be the focus of this section.
A primary objective of containerization "is to obtain
maximum ef f iciencies...at the lowest overall cost... [and]
containers should be stuffed to the maximum extent possible"
[Ref. 19:p. VI-12] Most containerization of ammunition
starts at the depot when a container is stuffed with
munitions (called outloading) and is then transported to a
Port of Embarkation (POE) . In the rest of this section, we
discuss the capabilities of depots, ports, in-transit
visibility, and in-theater operations.
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1. Depot Capability
The ability of depots to outload containers is a
function of the infrastructure, equipment, and labor
available. The infrastructure includes road and rail
networks, and container facilities. Equipment includes
Material Handling Equipment (MHE) , Container Handling
Equipment (CHE), containers, and chassis. Labor includes
the workforce needed to outload the containers. In recent
years, all Tier I depots have undergone extensive
construction to improve their ability to outload. Over $118
million in improvements was identified for rail and road
networks, container holding areas, container repair
facilities, and container pads (places to stuff containers)
for Tier I facilities. Under current funding, these
improvements for Tier I facilities are projected to be
completed by fiscal year 2003. [Ref. 11]
MHE is used to stuff the container and CHE is used to
make the intermodal transfer to a railcar, truck, or
chassis. CHE and MHE are used extensively throughout the
supply chain. Once ammunition is loaded inside a container,
it moves as a unit load for the entire movement in the
supply pipeline. The availability of proper container types
is critical to outloading. Each depot maintains 4700
twenty-foot ISO containers for the initial shipment of
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ammunition and relies on the commercial industry to supply
additional containers. [Ref. 30]
TURBO CADS 1994 tested the concept of commercial
industry providing containers for the shipment of
ammunition. Because of the explosive nature and other
characteristics of ammunition, an ammunition suitable
container must be new or in nearly new condition.
Industry's initial inability to provide suitable containers
resulted in a recommendation that DoD communicate ammunition
container requirements to the commercial industry more
efficiently. The commercial industry has the ability to
provide suitable containers, and in the future, greater
emphasis will be placed on contracts for leasing
containers. [Ref. 37]
Stuffing a container is usually labor intensive because
individual pallets of munitions must be blocked and braced
with wood dunnage inside the container. The use of new
equipment such as Container Roll-On/Off Platform (CROP) may
provide efficiencies in outloading. The CROP is a modified
flatrack designed to fit inside a twenty-foot ammunition
container. It is a reusable, relatively woodless dunnage
system that consists of a flatrack and tie down points. The
Palletize Loading System (PLS) can lift the CROP out of the
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container without the use of CHE/MHE and transport it to the
user. (CROP and PLS are both described in Chapter III)
The CROP eliminates the need for large amounts of wood
dunnage which will save money and labor costs at the depot.
Since each type of ammunition (configured as a single DODIC
load or SCL/MCL) stuffed inside a container uses different
amounts of dunnage, a cost comparison can only be estimated
for each load. On average, $350 is spent on dunnage costs
per container compared to $50 or less for the wood per each
CROP use. The wood used with the CROP is for safety reasons
to prevent sparking due to metal to metal contact.
Additional savings should be realized through the reduction
of labor needed to install dunnage. Additionally, the CROP
can be accessed from three sides, possibly further reducing
loading times. A load time of 10 minutes for the Load and
Roll Pallet (LRP) for Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS)
missile could be an indication some possible loading times.
There is no data available comparing an individual container
load time to a CROP loading time for specific types of
ammunition or SCL/MCL. [Ref. 33]
The weight of the CROP flatrack (4,000 pounds) is a
disadvantage. This weight prevents containers from being
stuffed with as much ammunition as when traditional wood
dunnage is used. Therefore, more containers may be reguired
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to move the same amount of ammunition than without CROPs
.
[Ref. 30,33,35] Depending on other cost elements, using the
CROP in peacetime may violate the objective of minimizing
costs by stuffing the container to the maximum extent. Cost
will be a minor factor during wartime. However, there is
some possibility, reguiring further research, that using
CROPS for prepositioned ammunition could reduce the number
of containers, facilitate rapid resupply of the services,
and reduce the time for routine maintenance inspections.
[Ref. 33]
Final production design specifications are currently
being developed for the CROP. The are currently 12,780 CROPs
on contract with options in place for an additional 12,780.
[Ref. 3] The CROP is delayed from being tested in TURBO
CADS 1998 due to production design changes. Before
production, the CROP should be tested by the commercial
transportation industry and seek approval from regulation
agencies like the Coast Guard. [Ref. 33] Any efficiencies
gained at the depot in outioading ammunitions will increase
the throughput to the war fighter.
2. Port Throughput Capability
Once a container of ammunition leaves the depot, it is
almost exclusively moved intermodally until it reaches the
theater of operations. Within CONUS, containers will move
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to a Port of Embarkation (POE) by rail or truck. The
commercial industry, which is efficient in intermodal
transportation, is normally used for these movements.
During peacetime and wartime, the majority of ammunition,
whether containerized or not, would move through one of the
three military ammunition ports. Currently, MOTSU is the
only containerized ammunition port with a capability of
moving 600 Twenty-foot equivalents (TEUs) per day.
MOTSU is the designated East Coast ammunition port to
support a Major Regional Contingency (MRC) West scenario.
NWS Concord and Port Hadlock make up the West Coast
ammunition port mainly to support a (MRC-East) scenario.
Without a West Coast port, ammunition would take 31 days to
move from MOTSU through the Panama Canal and to Korea versus
16 days from the West coast. There are ongoing improvements
to NWS Concord and Port Hadlock that will increase there
throughput capacity from a combined total of just over 250
to over 600 TEUs per day. [Ref. 2] The needed improvements
listed in Table 4 were identified in the MRS and as a result
of TURBO CADS exercises.
Commercial ports are restricted in how much ammunition
can be throughput at one time. Ports are limited by the
Quantity Distance (QD) requirements and Net Explosive Weight
(NEW) of the ammunition per the Code of Federal Regulation
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Concord Port Hadlock
Gantry Cranes Gantry Crane
Pier Upgrade Rail Transfer Facility
Holding Pads Truck Processing Center
Rail Repairs Container Holding Lots
Channel Restriction Study Transshipment Facility
Table 4. Needed Port Improvements [Ref. 2]
(CFR) 29 and 49. [Ref. 19:p. VI-14] The Coast Guard
regulates waivers to exceed ammunition storage limits in
ports during peacetime and wartime. Under the Voluntary
Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) , commercial liners
agreed that they will carry surge and sustainment cargo on
regular liner service. Surge and sustainment cargo consists
of unit equipment, general cargo, and ammunition. It is
untested if commercial liner companies would risk shipping
ammunition on regular container routes with commercial
cargo. During the VISA Joint Planning Advisory Group (JPAG)
meeting in April 1997, ammunition didn't meet the "criteria
to be eligible for lift by a pure liner carrier." [Ref.
36:p. 4] Transportation of ammunition under VISA has not
been fully tested in an exercise.
Several types of ships and barges provide sealift, such
as Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) , Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH) , and
container ships. When containers arrive at the Port of
Debarkation (POD) , the port may be either an industrialized
fixed location such as Ad Damman, Saudi Arabia with 60
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berths, or dependent on self-sustaining ships and (LOTS)
operations. DoD has recognized the capability,
effectiveness, and efficiency of using commercial intermodal
transportation assets. The extensive use of containers
makes CHE/MHE an essential element of the ammunition supply
chain, but only large modern ports have the capability to
move great amounts of containers at one time. [Ref. 18 :p.
II-9]
3. In-transit Visibility
As discussed previously, there are several information
systems used by DoD to track ammunition. A system's ability
to maintain visibility of ammunition is reliant on
interfacing with commercial systems and receiving data from
tracking devices. The use of Electronic Data Interchange
(EDI) standards has enabled other systems to track
ammunition by conveyance or container number while moving
through a port and on a ship.
The emergence of Radio Frequency (RF) tags and bar
codes has aided in the in-transit visibility of ammunition
and general supplies. Both systems require readers to
gather the data and transmit it to a user or information
depository. In-transit visibility gives commanders the
ability to influence the flow of ammunition depending on the
situation. When the location of a container is known, it
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can be redirected or prioritized for faster service.
Potential problems include RF Tag reader and information
system breakdowns. For instance, during TURBO CADS 95, the
freguency of the tags for containers entering Japan
interfered with the radio spectrum. [Ref. 38] This prevented
testing of RF Tags during the exercise. The potential for
overloading systems with data, or systems not communicating
is also possible. This could lead to problems such as in
DS/DS where an estimated forty-percent (about 25,000) of all
containers were opened to determine the contents due to a
lack of communication between and within the commercial
industry and DoD. [Ref. 22:p. 182]
4. Lift and In-theater Capability
Lift at the POD is dependent on the discharge location
and port facilities. This can vary from modern ports to
ports that have no ability to off-load a ship. CHE/MHE
resources can also pose problems with unloading a ship.
During DS/DS, Ad Damman in Saudi Arabia was a modern
facility, but shortages in CHE/MHE prevented the efficient
reception, onward movement, and in-theater handling of
containers. [Ref. 22:p. 182].
Depending on the situation at the port, commanders may
need a self-sustaining ship with its own cranes to off-load
containers. Another option is to off-load containers using
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LOTS either because the port is damaged or to overcome port
throughput constraints. Once the container is off-loaded,
additional movement requires specialized CHE. Probably the
most important type of specialized CHE equipment is the
50,000 pound Rough Terrain Container Handler (RTCH) because
of its maneuverability and capabilities in various
conditions
.
Success in containerizing ammunition is dependent on
the theater infrastructure and equipment necessary to handle
containers. In DS/DS, the lack of infrastructure and CHE
prompted the breakbulk transportation of ammunition instead
of containerization. [Ref. 22:p. 185]
The limited availability of CHE and surface
transportation can cause a choke point at the POD and at
storage points. Containers can be transported by utilizing
flatbed trailers, the PLS, and Host Nation Support (HNS)
trucks. Some type of CHE will be needed to load/unload
containers onto trucks and trailers, but a PLS can load and
unload itself. The PLS can carry one container weighing up
to 16.5 tons using a Container Lift Kit (CLK) . The kit
attaches to the end of a container and enables the PLS to
lift and carry a container like a flatrack. The PLS, in
effect, becomes the CHE and transportation. [Ref. 12 :p. 15]
The PLS is limited to lifting only one container.
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If a container uses a CROP, the PLS can unload the CROP
and move it forward to supply points in the theater. This
could free up the ammunition container for retrograde
movement or another use.
When a container arrives at its final destination, the
ammunition must be unstuffed and stored. Manpower and time
is required to unload a traditionally stuffed container. If
ammunition is stored on a CROP, there are savings in
manpower and time when unloading the ammunition. It takes
an estimated four soldiers, one forklift, and sixty minutes
to unload a fully stuffed container. With the CROP, it
takes two soldiers, one PLS truck, and five minutes. [Ref.
35] CROPs with Strategic or Mission Configured Loads can
increase the throughput and distribution of ammunition once
it arrives in the theater.
E . CONCLUSIONS
The ability of the ammunition supply chain to meet the
needs of the CINC are dependent on many factors throughout
all three levels of war. The responsiveness of the chain
relies on the coordination of each service and the ability
of management systems to interface effectively. Efficiency
is gained by minimizing the impacts of choke points in the
flow. Some major choke points identified were the
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outloading capability of depots, Container Handling
Equipment (CHE), and in-theater operations.
The next chapter discusses recent operations and
exercises involving the intermodal ammunition transportation




V. RECENT OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES
A, INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Military has utilized the intermodal system of
transportation to different degrees in various operations.
The uniqueness of ammunition presents a number of obstacles
for intermodal transportation. United States Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM) has recognized these challenges and
employed a series of exercises to address and study the
operation of transporting ammunition intermodally . These
exercises, called TURBO CADS (Containerized Ammunition
Distribution System) , have provided invaluable information
and data for the analysis of ammunition containerization.
This chapter looks at the development of containerized
ammunition, and four of the TURBO CADS exercises from the
years 1994, 1995, 1997 and 1998.
B. OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the first
major U.S. Military conflict since the commercial container
revolution. While containers were used in this effort,
their full potential was not realized, and containers played
a small part of the sealift operation. The initial thrust
was partially supported by containers through the use of the
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Maritime Preposition Ships (MPS). Of the 300,000 short tons
of ammunition transported to the Gulf region during Desert
Storm, only 5 percent was sent by container. The primary
reasons for this containerization shortfall were:
• Limited availability of ammunition suitable
containers
.
• Lack of west coast containerized ammunition
capability.
• Lack of container handling equipment at the units in
the field and ports of debarkation. [Ref. 4:p. 49]
The United States also only had one containerized
ammunitions port, Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point
(MOTSU) , in Southport, North Carolina. All of the shipments
from this specialized container port during Desert
Shield/Desert Storm were by breakbulk. However, this
inefficiency did not hinder the U.S. Forces due the large
amount of staging time afforded by the scenario. Iraqi
troops invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. President Bush
ordered U.S. Troops to the area on August 7, 1990, beginning
the portion of the operation known as Desert Shield. By
November, the following force elements were in place: Four
Army Divisions, one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) , 1000
combat aircraft (approx.) and 60 Navy Ships. [Ref. l:p.l]
The build-up continued until the first major air strike
on January 17, 1991. The ground attack was launched on
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February 24, 1991, and Kuwait was liberated on February 28,
1991. The deployment was very successful, but the fact that
the United States had over three months to stage all troops,
equipment, and supplies, including ammunition, did not make
this a rapid deployment situation. The three months allowed
ample time to get the ammunition in theater and staged. The
Gulf War was also over very quickly, so the support system
was not fully tested.
Desert Shield/Storm, however, did provide the U.S.
Military with a view of the possibilities of containerized
transportation and forced further study of its use.
C. MOBILITY REQUIREMENT STUDY
In the Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense Authorization
Act, Congress tasked the DoD with conducting a study of the
military's future mobility requirements. (This tasking was
actually initiated in 1990, before Desert Shield.) The
study was headed by the Director for Force Structure,
Resources and Assessment (J-8) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In January 1992 they issued their expectations and
recommendations as the Mobility Requirement Study (MRS). The
primary focus of this study was strategic mobility, the
ability to transport sufficient quantities of men and
material in support of military contingency abroad. In the
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area of containerization there were three main
recommendations
:
• Integration of containerization as the primary mode
of ammunition transportation.
• Acquisition of a fleet of 20 foot containers and
container handling equipment.
• Upgrade of existing facilities to appropriate output
levels and establishment of a west coast container
facility. [Ref. 14:p. VII-7]
These recommendations would make ammunition
distribution more efficient, and would ensure that adequate
amounts of ammunition would arrive in theater in time during
a contingency. Establishment of the Concord, CA, Naval
Weapons Station as an ammunition container facility would
ensure adequate rapid container throughput to the Western
Pacific and Indian Ocean areas.
The attention given to ammunition by the Mobility
Requirement Study prompted USTRANSCOM to develop a series of
exercises to test and develop the intermodal transportation
of ammunition. These are the TURBO CADS exercises.
D. TURBO CADS 94
The first TURBO CADS operation was conducted in the
Pacific Theater from August 1 to November 27, 1994, and was
sponsored by USTRANSCOM. The operation was designed to test
the effectiveness of intermodal ammunition transportation
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by shipping munitions from multiple continental United
States (CONUS) origins to multiple United States Pacific
Command (USPACOM) destinations. The TURBOCADS 94 objectives
were to:
• Evaluate on-hand container handling equipment and
identify any container handling shortages.
• Identify shortfalls in the transportation system
that could prevent the routine continuous use of
containerized munitions.
• Demonstrate and evaluate the usefulness and
convenience of blocking and bracing improvements
compared to breakbulk.
• Observe and evaluate inland rail movements of
containerized munitions to designated unstuffing
locations in Korea.
• Observe and evaluate containerized munitions
transfer operations at various inland locations.
• Assist in the development of container doctrine, as
well as hardware requirements.
• Exercise NWS Concord's container throughput
capability. [Ref. 37:p. 3]
The "lessons learned" from this exercise stated that
the exercise effectively executed its objectives and proved
to be fairly successful. One area did, however, cause
significant concern. That was the lack of Container
Handling Equipment (CHE) . Borrowing and leasing CHE was the
norm for areas with shortcomings. This presented a
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potential hurdle in the smooth operation of containerized
ammunition transfer.
The use of the two self-sustaining container ships for
the exercise, 55 Gem State and MV Green Wave, was
appropriate because the Outside Continental United States
(OCONUS) ports, at the time, did not have the capability to
discharge a non-self-sustaining ship.
It was also noted that communication and dialogue
between the commercial intermodal industry and the DoD
required improvement. A recommendation was made that
USTRANSCOM and commercial customers meet during the
contracting process to clarify requirements and provide
accurate information on capabilities of the planned depots
and ports. Overall, 17,722 short tons were moved at a cost
of $830/short ton for a total cost of $14.7 Million. [Ref
.
38:p.l0] With these points in hand, the stage was set for
the next TURBO CADS exercise the following year.
E. TURBO CADS 95
The purpose of TURBO CADS 95 was to use the lessons
learned from TURBO CADS 94 and improve on them. Many of the
objectives were similar, but also included:
• Place more emphasis on partnership with the
commercial transportation industry and civilian
ports
.
• Employ newer CHE technologies and doctrine.
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• Provide and utilize a standing door-to-door contract
with the carrier.
• Emphasize Army and Marine Corps operations more.
• Emphasize Korea, both in and out.
• Evaluate alternative dunnage.
• Evaluate Intransit Visibility (ITV). [Ref. 38:p.2]
Among the ports to be utilized and shipped to in TURBO
CADS 95 were Valdez Alaska, Hawaii, Port Hadlock, NWS
Concord, Okinawa, Misawa, Sasebo, Hiro, and Chinhae. The
articles to be transported were:
• USAF - Standard operational munitions.
• Army - Training munitions.
• USMC - Training munitions.
This would use no more than 2000 containers in all.
There was a combination of two plans under consideration in
the initial exercise design phase. Together Plans A and B
would provide for the total ammunition lift requirement.
The principal objective of Plan A was to utilize
commercial door-to-door service, including the use of
commercial ports. Two hundred and thirty-six TEUs were to
be shipped from CONUS to Korea. There was particular
interest in the capabilities of commercial West coast ports
to ship containers to Pusan.
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Plan B was to supplement Plan A by utilizing commercial
door-to-door service, but routed through military instead of
commercial ports. This would cover the remaining 1536 TEU
lift requirement. Shipments were to go from NWS Concord to
ports in Hawaii, Okinawa, Japan and Korea. These shipments
were available to all US flagged carriers through open
competition
.
Plan A was not successful. Korea disapproved use of
Pusan, so Plan A' s container assignment was merged with Plan
B. The movements were accomplished with MSC Charters and
Commercial Carriers. A total of 30,780 short tons were
moved for $596/short ton or a total of $18.3 Million.
There were several major lessons learned from this
exercise. Commercial door-to-door service was not possible
without conducting risk assessments and obtaining waivers
for ports and intermodal transfer facilities. Limits and/or
restrictions on Net Explosive Weight (NEW) must be worked
out prior to port planning. Commercial waivers are very
difficult to obtain but the Military Traffic Management
Command (MTMC) has waiver authority for DoD facilities.
The west coast DoD munitions ports, Port Hadlock and
NWS Concord, were not as effective as in the previous TURBO
CADS exercise. Recommendations were made to continue full
funding of the NWS Concord container port upgrade, to
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upgrade Port Hadlock' s container gantry crane, and to
continue working munitions movements through commercial
ports
.
Commercial transportation industry response was fairly
poor. Ocean carriers' proposals would not meet deadlines,
and the lack of backloads from west coast ports caused slow
truck support until increased funding was paid for deadhead
mileage. Ocean, rail and truck carriers need to be included
in exercise planning meetings to relieve these conflicts.
It was discovered that ITV through Automatic
Identification Technologies (AIT) required host nation
approval for radio frequency (RF) spectrum usage. This also
needs to be incorporated into the planning phase.
Oceangoing tug-barges provided a viable strategic
capability for sustainment and resupply. A 680 TEU tug-
barge unit with a 120 ton crane and container handling
equipment was self sustaining and reliable. They could make
the trip from NWS Concord to Chinhae, Korea at 8-10 knots in
21-26 days, only 5-6 days longer than container ships. These
vessels also provided an excellent platform for Joint
Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) operations if port
facilities were not available. [Ref. 38:p.l6]
Overall, integrating CADS with existing commercial
intermodal service proved to be very challenging. Hence,
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this was to be the focus of the CENTCOM (Central Command)
TURBO CADS 96 exercise. The 96 exercise was canceled
however due to various reasons including difficulties in
contracting services, obtaining port waivers and permits,
and overall funding.
F. TURBO CADS 97
The objectives of the cancelled TURBO CADS 96 were
planned to be revisited in 1997. United States Central
Command (USCENTCOM) was again the area of interest for the
exercise nicknamed "Depot to Desert 97".
TURBO CADS 97 was again sponsored by USTRANSCOM with an
operational interest by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS) . United States Commander in Chief Central
(USCINCCENT) and United States Commander in Chief Pacific
(USCINCPAC) were the supported CINCs for this exercise. The
primary objectives were to:
• Meet supported CINC requirements.
• Exercise DoD/OCONUS munitions depots and ports.
• Exercise theater container management/distribution
systems
.
• Train personnel in container operations.
• Verify ability to handle munitions per the
Operational Plan (OP LAN)
.
• Assess industry performance and responsiveness
lleasing, motor, rail, ocean)
.
82
• Exercise commercial/Ready Reserve Force (RRF)
sealift capability to move containerized munitions.
• Exercise DoD, industry, host nation interoperability
(assets, facilities, procedures, and information
systems) . [Ref . 39:p. 4]
This exercise had an initial requirement to call
forward 777 TEUs to the area of operation. Planned Sea
Ports of Debarkation (SPOD) were Kuwait and Ad Dammam, with
922 TEUs retrograde to return to NWS Concord. (145 of the
retrograde TEUs bound for NWS Concord were not associated
with the deployment portion of the exercise.) The sealift
in this exercise was unique in that a Lighter Aboard Ship
(LASH) vessel was utilized. The Ready Reserve Force LASH
ship Cape Farewell was the chosen vessel. It has a
sustained speed of 18.7 knots and could hold 150 TEUs
stacked in forward holds, 252 TEUs in 36 barges in the mid-
holds and 375 TEU on the weather deck. This exercise
validated the use of LASH vessels modified for munitions
containers. [Ref. 39:p.7-8]
The partial use of barges also provided increased
flexibility in delivery of munitions containers. Barges
from the LASH vessel were unloaded at the port entrance in
Kuwait and moved by tugs to the off load area. This reduced
the required port draft by not requiring the LASH vessel
itself to enter the port. Retrograde containers were also
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returned to the LASH vessel in a similar manner. A plan is
now being considered to modify four LASH vessels in the RRF
to carry 1600 TEUs of containerized munitions per vessel.
The costs of Depot to Desert 97 included $5.5 Million
for ocean transport, $3 Million for CHE and container
leasing, $6.5 Million for port handling/inland
transportation, and $227,000 for dunnage. The final after
action report for TURBO CADS 97 is not yet available;
however, LASH vessel concepts and port operation data appear
to be beneficial.
G. TURBO CADS 98
This exercise, which has yet to be executed, will occur
in the USCINCPAC Area of Responsibility (AOR) and focus on
the following objectives:
• Meet and support CINC munitions requirements.
• Exercise the new container facility in Chinhae,
Korea.
• Exercise the new intermodal container transfer
facility at Naval Sub Base Bangor WA.
• Exercise DoD munitions ports NWS Concord and Port
Hadlock
.
• Exercise CONUS munitions depots.
• Exercise theater container management and
distribution systems during Reception, Staging, and
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Onward Movement (RSOI) exercise 98 or theater
exercises
.
• Exercise DoD as weii as the foreign and domestic
commercial industry (motor, rail, ocean)
.
• Train forces in container operations (container
handling, stuffing, blocking, and bracing)
.
• Evaluate container leasing process (ordering,
quality, and timeliness).
• Exercise new container hardware, if available (CROP
(Containerized Roll On/Off Platform) , PLS
(Palletized Loading System), Improved RTCH (Rough
Terrain Container Handler), and commercial CHE.
• Exercise joint munitions planning and execution
procedures and systems.
• Exercise reserve transportation/ammunition handling
units in OCONUS exercises, if available.
• Exercise strategic configured load concepts such as
CAPEX (Combat Ammunition Production Exercise) and
AMX (Air Mobility Express) . [Ref . 40:p.2-4]
These objectives stress the actual operation of
facilities, systems, personnel, and equipment more than the
previous exercises. It is ambitious yet should provide
invaluable data for current intermodal ability. The initial
requirement requires 1000 TEUs called forward and 800 TEUs
retrograde. While actual SPODs within the PACOM AOR are
being determined, an emphasis of this exercise is on the
CONUS SPOE (Sea Ports of Embarkation) . Current funding for
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the exercise is set at $12 Million funded by the JCS
.
Scheduled completion of the exercise is set for July 1998.
H. CONCLUSIONS
It is evident that the Department of Defense has
recognized the container revolution and its place in
transporting ammunition. Its own Mobility Requirement Study
states that intermodal containers should be the primary mode
of transporting ammunition. The development and
implementation of a full scale system however is slow. Port
regulations, commercial integration, and lack of required
port infrastructure are a lew of the primary problems being
encountered in the shift to containerized ammunition.
Through the use of TURBO CADS exercises, solutions to these
problems are being explored.
The upgrading of NWS Concord is key to satisfying the
container port requirements needed to achieve rapid global
reach of containerized ammunition. Commercial ocean
carriers must be incorporated into the planning for
ammunition movement operations. The implementation of the
VISA agreement must also be enforced to ensure sufficient
vessels are available in the need of a crisis. VISA should
also oe implemented during occasional training operations to
ensure the readiness of all units and ocean carriers
involved.
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Through the training of the TURBO CADS exercises,
continued infrastructure development, and coordination with
commercial entities, CADS can reach its full potential and
rapidly provide U.S. Military forces with the ammunition





The ammunition supply chain, like almost all systems,
is in a perpetual state of change and development. This
chapter analyzes key issues related to the success and/or
failure of the system.
A. LIMITATIONS IN THE AMMUNITION SUPPLY FLOW
1. Depot Capabilities
The ammunition depot is the starting point in the
ammunition supply chain. The physical act of stuffing
containers with ammunition is time consuming and labor
intensive. The use of wood dunnage to secure an ammunition
shipment inside of containers is a meticulous process. The
development of the CROP has the potential to reduce labor
cost and stuffing time by streamlining the container loading
and unloading process. Although still in development, the
CROP has the potential to eliminate the use of dunnage and
speed the loading and unloading process.
Additionally, depots can increase flow in the supply
system by utilizing more configured loads (MCL/SCL) to ship
outside of CONUS . Combining MCLs and SCLs with the CROP
will minimize any potential re-configuration or re-stuffing
of ammunition enroute to the end-users. This will reguire
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increased planning to forecast planned ammunition usage, but
will expedite shipment of ammunition containers by utilizing
the unit load concept.
2. Port Throughput Capabilities
a) Ports of Embarkation (POE)
Once the containers of ammunition depart the
depots, they enter the intermodal network of the commercial
transportation industry. The efficiency and coordination of
network intermodal operations should ensure timely delivery
of containers to the Port of Embarkation (POE) . The upgrades
of the West Coast military ammunition port infrastructure
at NWS Concord and Port Hadlock to achieve a 600 TEUs per
day throughput are a positive step in relieving a very
significant constraint. However, once the upgrades are
completed, follow-up and recurrent testing of both ports'
capability is necessary. The continued use of TURBO CADS
exercises will test the improvements and offer suggestion
for additional changes. The throughput capacity provided by
these two ports is a major cornerstone for a Major Regional
Contingency (MRC) East scenario and can supplement a MRC-
West scenario.
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b) Ports of Debarkation (POD)
Characteristics of the selected Ports of
Debarkation (PODs) will greatly affect the possible
throughput of ammunition to the user. Elements such as
available roads, host nation support transportation, port
offload capabilities, and available CHE are critical in
avoiding potential choke points. Identifying and eliminating
these potential choke points during contingency planning can
reduce the impact of ammunition supply to the warfighter.
One feasible method for smooth port entry is the use of tug-
barges .
The introduction of oceangoing tug-barges can provide a
viable strategic capability for transporting ammunition into
a theater and reducing the impact of limited capability
ports. The tug-barge, which was tested in TURBO CADS 96,
provided an excellent platform to support LOTS operations
and allow access to shallow ports. Unlike the LASH and
Seabarge (SEABEE) Ships, which reguire additional CHE in
port or up river, the tug-barge was self-sustaining because
it carried a portable 120-ton crane. With the changing
conditions of the world and the need to project forces
anywhere, the introduction of versatile support concepts in
the delivery of ammunition and other cargo is required. The
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tug-barge concept should be used in contingency planning for
austere port environments.
3. In-theater Lift Capabilities
Once ammunition containers arrive in-theater, forward
movement is limited by the availability of transportation
and CHE assets. Items such as the PLS, RTCH and RTCC (see
Chapter III) are scarce resources that must be managed
closely; a lack of these resources can limit the options of
the warfighter. The use of a PLS with a Container Lift Kit
will provide relief for limited CHE. In this role the PLS
doubles it capability by allowing it to transfer as well as
transport ammunition containers. When combined with the
CROP, in-theater throughput can be greatly increased by not
relying on limited CHE, and the time to unload a container
is reduced. This combination adds flexibility to the
ammunition supply chain on the battlefield.
B. FUTURE TRENDS
1 . Management Systems
Military commanders reguire real-time information
concerning material and logistics support capability in
order to fight and win. The need for real-time information
can be provided by the Joint ammunition Standard System
(JAMSS) described in Chapter IV. The JAMSS has the potential
for creating a seamless flow of information that will allow
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commanders at all levels to maintain control, visibility,
and status of ammunition assets. Incorporating the needs of
each service in the design, development, and testing of the
system can ensure that the system meets the needs all
services and the warfighting CINCs. Maintaining visibility
will give CINCs the capability to influence the ammunition
flow depending on the fluidity of the situation. This will
nave a positive effect in reducing the fog of war by knowing
and influencing the ammunition supply chain to provide the
right product to the right place at the right time.
JAMSS has the capability to permit the coordination of
DoD and commercial industry activities through one system.
The cooperation and integration of each service along with
commercial industry in the planning and development stages
can facilitate an environment where jointness and each
service's individuality is maintained.
Providing a seamless flow of information through
visibility will increase the warfighter's readiness.
Visibility provides a flexible and responsive ammunition
supply chain and thereby acts as a force multiplier.
Combining real-time information with the PLS and CROP,
enables the warfighter to direct delivery of ammunition as
needed to influence the outcome of a battle.
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2. Container Roll On/Off Platform (CROP)
Part of the DoD Logistics Strategic Plan calls for the
reduction in the cost and footprint of logistics support
without reducing readiness. [Ref. 27:p. 4] The potential
capability of the CROP and its associated cost could help
DoD obtain this goal. Utilizing the CROP could result in
cost reduction by:
• The reduction in dunnage needed to ship ammunition.
• The reduction in manpower required to load and unload
a CROP.
• The reduction in CHE needed at the POD and in-theater
through the use of the PLS and Container Lift Kit.
• Using the CROP with prepositioned stock to reduce the
maintenance inspection time of ammunition.
Cost savings resulting from the decreased use of
dunnage would be realized over time from multiple shipments
of ammunition using the CROP. Potential cost savings in
dunnage of $300 or more per container of ammunition will be
realized. The projected cost of a CROP is $6,000 to $7000.
Potential cost savings should result from using less dunnage
per shipment, and less manpower to load and unload the
container. Readiness is increased through the faster in-
theater delivery of ammunition to the troops.
There is a weight trade-off of the CROP. The weight of
the system, approximately 4,000 lbs., will obviously reduce
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the usable weight capacity of the containers to hold
ammunition, but the speed of loading and unloading will
produce labor cost savings and increased throughput.
The CROP should be utilized with prepositioned
ammunition containers to provide rapid delivery of
ammunition to initial entry forces. Using CROPs in
prepositioned containers can reduce the reliance on in-
theater CHE, and provide mobility through ease of movement
and transfer by the PLS anywhere on the battlefield. There
are also potential savings during preposition ammunition
maintenance cycles as the CROP would eliminate the need to
remove and replace dunnage during inspections. Instead, the
CROP would be rolled out, the ammunition inspected, then
rolled back into the container.
There are other uses for the CROP besides moving
ammunition. It can be used to rapidly move general supplies
to combat units including water, food, and repair parts. The
traditional PLS flatrack is currently being used in this
way.
Further research and analysis of the CROP is needed to:
• Project accurate savings through stuffing containers
with each type of munition versus using traditional
methods of stuffing.
• Determine savings from the reduction in manpower
requirements from less loading and unloading times.
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• Determine the impact of utilizing CROP in
prepositioned containers.
• Convert PLS flatracks to CROPs
.
The CROP together with a container and the PLS can
increase readiness through flexibility, ease of movement,
and rapid accessibility.
3. Commercial Industry
The logistics foot print in a theater of operations may
be reduced by continued and increased reliance on the
commercial transportation industry to provide fast, accurate
support
.
Further development of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
Agreement (VISA) with commercial ocean shippers should also
be considered. Including ammunition as a qualifying
criteria for lift by a pure liner carrier will be critical
for utilizing all available means of transportation. The
DoD needs to practice or exercise these agreements in
peacetime as they would in war to fully analyze any
shortcomings in the sea lift capabilities of commercial
liners with respect to ammunition.
Under VISA, DoD would utilize the abilities of the
commercial liner companies to move surge and primarily
sustainment cargo to a theater of operations. The
transportation of ammunition under VISA agreements needs to
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be tested in peacetime and addressed during VISA JPAG
meetings (see Chapter IV). The past VISA JPAG meeting in
April 1997 did not address ammunition specifically enough to
anticipate potential problems associated with transporting
ammunition through commercial ports or on commercial liners
with commercial cargo. [Ref. 36] VISA participants should,
to a feasible extent, be periodically exercised in
ammunition transport to test and increase readiness.
Shipping ammunition with valuable commercial cargo is a
significant risk in the case of an emergency aboard the
carrier or in port. During war, this risk may be out
weighed by the benefits to National Security in providing
timely support to the CINC. Even so, the benefits of
peacetime training are less likely to out weigh this danger
to private citizens and property. These benefits and risks
merit further analysis.
4. New Equipment
New equipment developments in the commercial
transportation industry need to be examined to determine
their impacts (positive or negative) on the ammunition
supply chain. The commercial industry has made improvements
in the transportation of intermodal containers through the
development of new equipment such as deep-well double stack
railroad container cars. These cars are designed to hold
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two forty-foot containers or up to four twenty-foot
containers, depending on the total weight of the containers.
However, the deep-well railcar may need a different type of
container handler or overhead crane to load containers other
than what depots now have in inventory. The ability of depot
CHE to load a deep-well railcar is unknown. Without the
ability to load this type of railcar, depots would have to
make sure they request other types of container railcars.
The first test of a depot capability to load a deep-well
railcar is scheduled to take place within the next three
months. [Ref. 33]
Another development is the shift to using forty-foot
containers for overseas movements by transportation
companies. DoD' s current dependency on the supply of
twenty-foot containers may be in jeopardy in the future.
This could present a problem in the intermodal movement of
containers at depots and in-theater. Current ongoing
improvements in the ammunition supply chain, such as depot
upgrades and port upgrades, are for transporting twenty-foot
containers. It is unlikely that any near-term impacts will
result. However, this development emphasizes the need to
keep abreast of commercial developments, and the potential
impact to the DTS, including the ammunition supply chain.
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This shift to forty-foot containers for international
shipments may also benefit the ammunition supply chain.
There is the possibility of loading two CROPs in a forty-
foot container, but this needs further research to address:
• DTS problems and in-theater capabilities.
• What type of CHE/MHE would be needed to unload the
second CROP given that a PLS can pull out the first
one
.
• Possibility of ammunition weight exceeding CHE and
container capability, or railcar weight limits.
• Possible development of forty-foot containers with
doors on each end.
5. Organizational Cooperation
An advisory board needs to be established to examine
new developments in the commercial world that affect the
ammunition supply chain. This board should include
organizations such as USTRANSCOM, IOC, Joint Ordnance
Command Group, Joint Transportation Board, Maritime
Administration (MARAD)
, Coast Guard, ammunition regulatory
agencies, and commercial industry representatives. The
duties of present boards could be expanded to address this
need.
DoD needs to facilitate close coordination with
regulatory agencies in the development of equipment used to
transport and handle ammunition. Including these agencies in
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the different phases of development will aid in the
acceptance of the equipment and policies enforcing safety
standards. This coordination can alleviate confusion and
choke points by examining how new developments like the CROP
will impact agency policies and regulations, and provide
solutions before the product is developed.
The suggestions presented in this chapter should
provide insight with respect to problems and trends that
will develop in the future. Understanding these problems
will enable managers, planners, and users of the ammunition
supply chain to anticipate the dynamic environment of




VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The final chapter of this thesis provides conclusions
and recommendations based on the authors' research and
analysis of the ammunition supply chain. Additionally,
proposed further research questions are introduced to
provide subject matter for future development and analysis
of the containerized ammunition transportation process.
A. CONCLUSIONS
Incorporating the development of new equipment and
concepts to make the ammunition supply chain more flexible
and responsive is a step in the right direction toward
supporting CINC's. The ability of the Defense
Transportation System to transport ammunition is adequate,
but there are areas that require improvements to increase
the utility of the ammunition supply chain. These areas
include the upgrades of West coast ports, intermodal
equipment developments, and organizational coordination
between DoD, regulatory agencies and commercial industry.
1 . Port Upgrades
The infrastructure upgrades of NWS Concord and Port
Hadlock to achieve a throughput of 600 TEUs per day are
positive steps toward increasing the throughput of
containerized ammunition. Currently, these ports are choke
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points in the flow of containerized ammunition from the West
coast
.
2 . Intermodal Equipment
The pool of intermodal equipment available in CONUS is
not currently a problem, but once ammunition containers
arrive m-theater, forward movement is limited by the
availability of transportation and CHE assets. Items such as
the Palletized Load System (PLS) and Rough Terrain Container
Handler (RTCH) are scarce resources that must be managed
closely because their capabilities act as a force
multiplier. The lack of these resources at critical areas
in the ammunition supply chain limits the flow of ammunition
to the troops.
The commercial industry has made improvements in the
transportation of intermodal containers including the
development of new equipment, which makes the ammunition
supply chain more responsive. The development of new
equipment, such as deep-well double stack railroad container
cars, has shown the potential to make the transportation of
containers more efficient, but the impact of this
development on the ammunition supply chain is uncertain.
3. Organizational Coordination
DoD maintains several management and information
systems to coordinate the full spectrum of transporting
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ammunition to the battlefield. Multiple systems operated
independently by each service exacerbate the difficulties of
coordinating the ammunition supply chain.
Individual services can no longer afford to act without
communicating with each other. The development of an
integrated management system will ensure that the individual
services will function as one in a joint environment.
DoD coordinates with other agencies on new eguipment
development in the transportation of ammunition, but this
coordination isn't fully integrated early in the equipment
development process. Because of the inherent dangers
involved in the transportation of ammunition, coordination
is required to gain safety approval and identify potential
setbacks involving the development of equipment used to
transport and handle ammunition.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Further Development of CROP System is Warranted
The Container Roll On/Off Platform (CROP) has the
potential to reduce costs and the footprint of logistical
support associated with containerized ammunition operations.
Through continued development and implementation of the CROP
system, reduction in required dunnage, labor, maintenance
and associated CHE can be realized as well as increased
flexibility, ease of movement and accessibility. This
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system will be the cornerstone of an efficient intermodal
system for both ammunition and conventional cargo for
supporting the warfighter.
Utilization of the CROP must be a key element in future
TURBO CADS exercises in order to demonstrate, train and
prove the effectiveness of this system. DoD' s current
effort in CROP development is promising and should be
fostered, including input from all armed services, until
full implementation of the CROP system has come to fruition.
2. Continue Development and Implementation of JAMSS
The need for a real-time information management system
for logistics support is critical in the new information
warfare age and joint operational environment. The Joint
Ammunition Management Standard System (JAMSS) has the
capabilities to provide full asset visibility through timely
and accurate data pertaining to containerized ammunition.
DoD should continue to develop and implement the JAMSS.
This will allow commanders of all services to control their
ammunition supply line, including interfaces with commercial
industry.
3. VISA Exercises and other Commercial Coordination
VISA should be exercised more often in peace time
operations to ensure commercial industries' readiness for an
actual contingency. A recurring issue of the TURBO CADS
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exercises is the lack of commercial industry cooperation.
This is partly based on the DoD' s failure to fully include
the ocean carriers in the planning phases of these
exercises. This is easily remedied and should be considered
in future exercises besides TURBO CADS such as Bright Star
and Cobra Gold.
4 . Follow-up and test New Infrastructure at Military
West Coast Ammunition Ports
The intermodal port upgrades at NWS Concord and Port
Hadlock must be completed and fully tested. Through future
TURBO CADS exercises, the goal of a sustained 600 TEU daily
throughput can be evaluated. These ports represent the
gateway to the Pacific for outbound ammunition containers
and supplement other areas around the world. If the 600 TEU
throughput is not realized, then action to bring the
deficient port(s) up to specification must be implemented.
5. Coordination with Regulatory Bodies
Increased coordination is needed with regulatory
agencies by the DoD in the development of eguipment used to
transport and handle ammunition. This coordination will aid
in the acceptance of new equipment and in development of
policies affecting the transportation of ammunition.
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6. Monitor Changes in Intermodal Technology and
Operations
An advisory board needs to be established to examine
new developments in the commercial world that affect the
ammunition supply chain. This board should include
organizations such as USTRANSCOM, IOC, Joint Ordnance
Command Group, Joint Transportation Board, Maritime
Administration (MARAD) , Coast Guard, ammunition regulatory
agencies, and commercial industry representatives.
C. FURTHER RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. CROP Cost Analysis
With implementation of the CROP system in the near
future, further understanding of its benefits and a detailed
cost analysis of the system would provide valuable data for
implementation, design improvements, and cost benefits to
the DoD. The analysis should examine manpower, the
logistical footprint, and load size issues, as well as
possible alternatives for transporting cargo other than
ammunition. Additionally, further research should be
conducted to explore using CROPS for prepositioned
ammunition which could reduce the number of containers,
facilitate rapid resupply of the services, and reduce the
maintenance inspection time for routine inspections. As the
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prototype CROPs enter field use, more data will be available
for this analysis and study.
2. Implications of Future use of 40 ft. Containers
With the gradual shift of commercial industry to the
use of 40 ft. versus 20 ft. containers, CHE/MHE
compatibility issues within the DTS will definitely arise.
This includes port capabilities and the available container
fleet. Future research into this trend is warranted.
3. Implications of the Double-Stack Well Railcar
Double-stack well cars are providing an ever increasing
proportion of the container throughput capacity of the
domestic railroad industry. Compatibility issues should be
researched to determine the ability of depot CHE to operate
with this type of railcar. Additionally, weight limitations
issues involving ammunition containers and the rail car
should be explored.
4 . Risks and Benefits of Loading Ammunition with
Commercial Cargo during Peace and War
Currently, ammunition is not considered a qualifying
criteria for pure lift by a liner carrier. This issue will
prohibit ammunition from being carried on commercial liners
with other commercial non-explosive cargo. It requires a
liner to be completely loaded with ammunition, or a liner
dedicated to carrying ammunition solely for a partial load.
A possible shortfall in the total lift capabilities for the
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sustainment of ammunition could result. This issue requires
significant attention and resolution though VISA.
Shipping ammunition with commercial cargo is a
significant risk. During war, this risk may be out weighed
by the benefits to National Security. However, the benefits
of peacetime training are less likely to out weigh the
danger. These benefits and risks merit further analysis.
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